Showing posts with label Interesting Reads. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Interesting Reads. Show all posts
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or Dunning-Kruger doesn't self-correct anymore.

> TL;DR. The Dunning-Kruger effect, that is, the difference between what people think they can do
and what they can actually do, used to close and self corrects with experience. My hypothesis that I introduce in this post is that AI keeps it open: it increases confidence and splits real capability into "with the tool" and "without the tool." For companies, that turns intrinsic capability from a productivity question into a governance one, and it is the capability that quietly erodes.

  1. The ending that used to be guaranteed (more or less)
  2. About the Dunning Kruger curve
  3. What AI changes
  4. The Gap that no longer closes
  5. Does it really matter?
  6. What it means for companies

1. The ending that used to be guaranteed (more or less)

Everyone knowns "Mount Stupid". Whether it’s the co-worker who’s researched a single online thread and wants to completely upend the operations of the team, or the new hire who’s watched a tutorial video and is convinced that everyone was doing everything incorrectly, we’ve all been there at one point or another.

The great thing about Dunning-Kruger is that there really is an ending to it. In the battle of experience vs. confidence, experience always wins. The difference between what you think you can do and what you can do is going to close on its own. There’s a simple, and really quite boring iteration that explains what happens: you do it, you break things, you mess up, but you figure it out. Until the day that your perception aligns with reality, the reality of the situation is going to keep the lights on.

Figure 1. The classic picture. Perceived capability runs ahead, crashes, then converges on actual capability. The gap closes.[Thierry ZOLLER]

Figure 1. The classic picture. Perceived capability runs ahead, crashes, then converges on actual capability. The gap closes.[Thierry ZOLLER]

2. About the Dunning-Kruger curve

Here's the thing: the chart that everyone think they know is actually not what it seems. The famous Dunning-Kruger curve, with its peak of confidence and valley of despair, didn't actually come from Dunning and Kruger. You won't find it in their 1999 paper, or in any of Dunning's later work. So, where did it come from? It started spreading like wildfire through management training and the internet in the mid-2000s. But the real study is actually pretty different. It compared how people thought they'd do with how they actually scored, and it was divided into four groups. The interesting thing is, the line on the chart just keeps going up - it doesn't peak and then drop like everyone thinks.

There's a lot of debate about this effect, and experts can't seem to agree on what it really means. Some researchers think it's just a statistical illusion, a combination of people naturally rating themselves higher than average and the phenomenon of regression to the mean. They point to studies that suggest this pattern is just a mirage, not really telling us anything significant. In my opinion, the key takeaway is that the pattern itself is real - that's what matters most to my hypothesis. What it actually signifies, however, is still up for debate.

I'm using this well-known chart on purpose, because it's familiar to everyone, not because it's the 1999 data. I guess, the point I'm making doesn't rely on the curve being entirely accurate. It only needs one thing that nobody disagrees with: people are not good at judging their own abilities, and the difference between what they can actually do and what they think they can do is significant. This gap is made even wider by a tool that affects how we perceive ourselves.

Belgium published first, France went deeper. Belgium's CCB released CyFun well before the October 2024 NIS 2 transposition deadline, built on NIST CSF and officially mapped to ISO 27001/27002. France's ANSSI published ReCyF, but as of March 2026 the underlying legislation still has not passed - making it a technically superior but legally unenforceable framework.Bottom line: ISO 27001-certified organisations in Belgium are largely compliant with a manageable gap list. The same organisations in France still have significant work ahead - and no hard deadline yet to do it by.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Belgium - The Head Start (4 Level Architecture, Control Counts, ISO27002 clusters, What are key measure and why do they matter, self-assessment)
  3. France - The Thorough Approach (The objective and means architecture, still waiting for the law, ISO Alignement ANSSIs own assessment
  4. ISO27002 Mapping as a common Anchor
  5. The Divergences
  6. Practical Impliaction

Part I: Introduction - One Directive, Two Answers

When the EU adopted NIS 2 (Directive 2022/2555) in December 2022, it set a clear expectation: member states had until October 17, 2024 to transpose its requirements into national law. What followed, at least across the Franco-Belgian border, is a study in contrasting regulatory cultures, institutional histories, and practical philosophies.

NIS 2 expanded covered sectors from 7 to 18, lowered size thresholds, made supply chain security and multi-factor authentication explicit obligations, and - most significantly - introduced Article 21's detailed list of required risk management measures. What the directive deliberately does not do is specify how each measure should be implemented. That granularity was left to member states, producing genuine policy diversity: two technically credible frameworks that are compatible at the technical level but structurally different in regulatory philosophy, timing, and practical demands.

The timeline below tells the story at a glance. Belgium formalised an existing, mature framework and published its official cross-framework mapping nine months before the deadline. France is still working through its legislative process 18 months after that same deadline.

Figure 1 : NIS2 Transposition timeline. Belgium met the Octobre 2024 deadline, France Transposing law remains a bill of March 2026.


Introduction

For years, we’ve all heard it: “Cyber threats are on the rise.” But how much is hype, and how much is reality ?

According to the IRIS 2025 report by Cyentia, it’s not hype. Since 2008, the number of publicly reported cyber incidents has increased by over 650%, climbing from 450 to nearly 3,000 per quarter.

But here’s the nuance that matters: this rise isn’t just about more attacks. It’s also about how attackers evolve, how we detect threats, and how regulation drives transparency. From the stealthy era of APTs to the ransomware boom and the pandemic’s IT transformation, every major spike has a cause.

As risk managers and CISOs, this isn’t just trivia-it’s critical context. Understanding these shifts helps us future-proof our strategies, rather than plan for a past that no longer exists.

Europe's Most Influencial CISOs of the year 2024

The below is an interview originally conducted by CIO-World, in which I was recognized as one of Europe’s Most Influential CISOs of 2024. The discussion goes beyond technical security and focuses on leadership: the core capabilities a CISO needs today, how regulatory frameworks can be used as strategic enablers of resilience, and how security leaders can operate credibly and effectively within the C-suite. It also explores the growing convergence of technology, governance, and compliance.

The original can be found at CIO-World.

As financial technology (FinTech) evolves rapidly, it faces an increasing number of cyber threats. Cybercriminals are constantly finding new ways to exploit weaknesses in payment systems, putting billions of dollars and countless identities at risk. A staggering statistic reveals that up to 75% of customers worldwide now use at least one FinTech service, a number projected to grow as more people embrace digital payments and online banking.

Source: CIO World 

Meet Thierry Zoller, the Chief Information Security Officer at J.P. Morgan Mobility Payments Solutions S.A. (Red. now Julius Baer) , whose mission is to stay one step ahead of these digital predators. With nearly three decades of experience in cybersecurity, Zoller brings a unique blend of technical expertise and strategic vision to one of the world’s largest financial institutions. His journey from a curious teenager in Luxembourg to a leading figure in global information security is an example of the power of passion and perseverance.

Thierry’s fascination with technology began early, driving him to explore the inner workings of systems and networks. This curiosity led him to dive deep into reverse engineering and system vulnerability analysis, skills that would become invaluable in his future roles.

His career has been marked by a series of high-profile positions, including Head of Security Risk and Compliance Europe for Amazon and CISO for Amazon Payments. These experiences have honed his ability to navigate the complex intersection of technology, finance, and security.

At J.P. Morgan, he faces his most challenging task yet: securing the future of mobile payments in an increasingly cashless world. His approach combines futuristic technology with a deep understanding of human behavior, recognizing that the weakest link in any security system is often the user.

Thierry’s impact extends far beyond his corporate role. As a prolific blogger and researcher, he has coordinated the disclosure of over 100 vulnerabilities and released numerous free security tools. His work has been cited in books and peer-reviewed papers, cementing his status as a thought leader in the field.

The 45-year-old security expert’s commitment to knowledge sharing has been a cornerstone of his career. This philosophy drives his continued efforts to educate and empower the next generation of cybersecurity professionals, contributing significantly to the global information security community.


What is Psychological Safety ?

Psychological safety is a concept that refers to an individual's perception of the consequences of taking an interpersonal risk in a work environment. It involves feeling safe to express oneself without fear of negative consequences to self-image, status, or career. In a psychologically safe team, members feel accepted and respected. This environment allows for open communication, creativity, and innovation, as individuals feel comfortable sharing their ideas, questions, concerns, and mistakes without fear of ridicule or retribution.

Amy Edmonson - TED Talk (Building a psychologically safe workplace)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhoLuui9gX8


This blog post will be updated periodically as I come across new practical information and experiences. You can subscribe to my blog if you wish to be kept updated.

Updates : 
  • 24.07.2020: Added number of reported data breaches to Statistics
  • 25.07.2020: Added the Role of the DPA as captured within the GDPR and added references
  • 25.07.2020: Added the section "Parliamentary Oversight" capturing parlamentary enquiries
  • 26.07.2020: Corrected the part about getting a copy of your original complaint. In fact, I only have received parts of it and am still waiting to receive the rest.
  • 27.07.2020: Due to popular demand I added a section "Legal Procedure".

I thought it is useful for the general audience to summarise my experience working with the CNPD as a Data Subject. Aligned with many other administrative procedures in Luxembourg: they have a nice appearance at the frontend but are tilted against your interest in the backend.



How to effectively evade the GDPR and the reach of the DPA (PART 1)


This is a post in a series of posts :
  1. How to deal with the DPA of Luxembourg as a Data Subject <-- Interesting in the context of this post.
As my regular readers know I reluctantly trust anything that isn't tested and battle proof. In the last 2 years, I applied the same logic that I apply to vulnerability research to the Data Privacy environments and proceeded to test a broad range of Data Subject Rights. Expect a few disclosures following this one.

In true Information Security Fashion (insiders will understand) have attributed this weakness the ID :
  • CDPWE-0001 - Does not designate a Representative in the European Union

Introduction

When I searched Google for my name an interesting website came up in the results. A company called "Rocket Reach" allowed others to buy access to my personal data. I was intrigued as I have never given any consent for Rocketreach to store (or even sell) my data and I saw no other legal basis for RocketReach processing of my data.

"Rocket Reach" a data broker that describes it's service as :
"Connect directly with the right decision makers, using the world's largest and most accurate database of emails and direct dials. Real-time verified data for 430 million professionals across 17 million companies, worldwide.Trusted by over 5.0 million users — powering sales, recruiting, and marketing at companies large and small.
Prospect, connect and converse with your leads at scale."

Issuing a DSAR

On the 5th of April  2019, I asked Rocketreach access to my personal data (Data Subject Access Request) and asked for the purpose and the legal basis of processing. Instead of giving me access to my data and reply adequately, RocketReach decided to delete/remove all traces of it and informed me that it did so the same day.

While it might be surprising to some, this is actually a common reaction to DSARs when the Data Controller realizes the data they have may have no real legal basis.

Filing a complaint 

On the 05th of April 2019, I filed a complaint with the Luxemburgish Data Protection Agency (CNPD). The reference for this complaint is #3018 (For those that want to request information/documents from the CNPD).

Waiting for roughly a year

"We agree with you but we can't do anything, sorry, move on"

On the 6th of March 2020 (1 year!) the CNPD responded as follows (Original Version on top, the Translated version at the bottom).

Monsieur Zoller,
La Commission nationale pour la protection des données (CNPD) se permet de revenir vers vous concernant votre réclamation du 5 avril 2019 à l’encontre de la société RocketReach.
Dans le cadre de l’instruction de votre réclamation, la société RocketReach nous a communiqué qu’elle considère que ce sont les utilisateurs de ses services, et non elle-même, qui sont les responsables du traitement pour ce qui concerne les données à caractère personnel traitées sur son site internet.
Par ailleurs, il ressort également de cette instruction que la société RocketReach est une société située aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique ne disposant pas d’un représentant dans l’Union au sens de l’article 27 du règlement général sur la protection des données (RGPD).
Au sujet des responsables du traitement établis dans des pays tiers, comme les Etats-Unis d’Amérique, nous souhaitons attirer votre attention sur le considérant (116) du RGPD qui précise que:
« Lorsque des données à caractère personnel franchissent les frontières extérieures de l'Union, cela peut accroître le risque que les personnes physiques ne puissent exercer leurs droits liés à la protection des données, notamment pour se protéger de l'utilisation ou de la divulgation illicite de ces informations. De même, les autorités de contrôle peuvent être confrontées à l'impossibilité d'examiner des réclamations ou de mener des enquêtes sur les activités exercées en dehors de leurs frontières. Leurs efforts pour collaborer dans le contexte transfrontalier peuvent également être freinés par les pouvoirs insuffisants dont elles disposent en matière de prévention ou de recours, par l'hétérogénéité des régimes juridiques et par des obstacles pratiques tels que le manque de ressources. »
Dans le cas de votre réclamation cela signifie que, bien que nous ne partagions pas le point de vue de RocketReach et que nous sommes au contraire d’avis que cette société est bien à considérer comme responsable du traitement pour les traitements de données à caractère personnel effectués sur son site internet, il nous est impossible de poursuivre plus en avant le traitement de votre réclamation. En effet, nous ne disposons pas des pouvoirs de mener des enquêtes et de faire appliquer les décisions que nous serions amenés à prendre sur le territoire des Etats-Unis d’Amérique.
Nous sommes dès lors au regret de vous informer que nous considérons qu’il nous est impossible de poursuivre de façon effective le traitement de votre dossier. 
Veuillez agréer, Monsieur Zoller, l’expression de nos sentiments distingués.

English Translation

Mr. Zoller,
The National Commission for Data Protection (CNPD) would like to get back to you regarding your complaint of 5 April 2019 against the company RocketReach.

Rocket Reach has informed us that it considers that it is the users of its services, and not itself, who are responsible for processing personal data processed on its website. Furthermore, it also emerges from this instruction that RocketReach is a company located in the United States of America that does not have a representative in the Union within the meaning of Article 27 of the General Regulation on Data Protection (RGPD). 

As regards data controllers established in third countries, such as the United States of America, we would like to draw your attention to recital (116) of the GDPR which states that: 'When personal data crosses the external borders of the Union, this may increase the risk that individuals may not be able to exercise their data protection rights, in particular to protect themselves against unlawful use or disclosure of such information.
Similarly, supervisory authorities may be faced with the impossibility to investigate complaints or activities outside their borders. Their efforts to work together in the cross-border context may also be hampered by insufficient preventive or remedial powers, heterogeneous legal regimes and practical obstacles such as lack of resources. » 

In the case of your complaint, this means that, although we do not share RocketReach's view and to the contrary believe that RocketReach is the data controller for the processing of personal data on its website, we are unable to take any further action in relation to your complaint. We do not have the authority to investigate and enforce any decision we would have to take in the United States of America. 

We regret to inform you that we consider it impossible for us to proceed with the processing of your case.

In Summary -  Rocketreach has not met the requirement of the GDPR to name an EU representative (Art27) to account for the processing of European Personal Data, they furthermore process data with no legal basis of millions of European data subjects. In their answer, the CNPD makes it sound like it is optional, it isn't. Instead of pursuing Rocketreach locally on that basis alone, the CNPD just gives up arguing it has no jurisdiction in the US.

In other words, just don't designate a representative in Europe, build your business model around the illegal exploitation of data from millions of European data subjects and you are fine?

I  am fully aware that I could engage in legal procedures.  That's however not in my interest as I don't want to bear the costs and efforts. The overall question you should ask yourself is: Do we need a European Institution that handles extra-territorial investigations and fines? Why should it take the time, money, and energy from an individual when the DPA is supposed to defend the rights of the data subjects?

What the CNPD could have done according to the GDPR [1]
  • to impose a temporary or definitive limitation including a ban on processing;
  • to order the suspension of data flows to a recipient in a third country or to an international organisation.
  • to impose an administrative fine pursuant to Article 83, in addition to, or instead of measures referred to in this paragraph, depending on the circumstances of each individual case;
  • to order the controller or processor to bring processing operations into compliance with the provisions of this Regulation, where appropriate, in a specified manner and within a specified period;

[1] https://cnpd.public.lu/en/commission-nationale/pouvoirs.html

Instead, Rocketreach just continues to sell the personal data of millions of European data subjects like nothing ever happened. Including all of the below :


Members of the CNPD

Members of the European Data Protection Board


CNIL










Interesting Reads - Week 12 / 2013


Food for thought 



I would like to invite you to this years OWASP BeNeLux Event, I won't give a talk this year but I happily invite you as part of OWASP BeNeLux Program Committee:

Quick Facts

Agenda

The agenda is a sound mix between Application Security, Forensics,  Risk Management and represents the current security landscape at large rather well: Building security into Applications in Enterprises, Managing Application Level Vulnerabilities, Source code review on a large scale. It also has 2 innovative talks on exploit mitigation and sandboxing javascript. 

Especially the talk about javascript sandboxing (JSand) has all my attention as it represent an interesting challenge that is hard to get right knowing the context within which javascript operates. It claims to be complete, requiring no Browser modifications and enforced client-side. The talk will also given at ASAC 2012 

Venue

Both the training day and the conference day take place at:
KU Leuven (University of Leuven)
iMinds-DistriNet Research Group
Celestijnenlaan 200A
B-3001 Heverlee
How to get there: http://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/about/route/
Hotel details: https://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=BeNeLux_OWASP_Day_2012#tab=Venue



[ Updated : Added  "10 Common Mistakes of Incident Responders" at the bottom]

The following post will brake one major rule I adhere to  when blogging, a post shall have not more than 10% of content that is not authored by myself. The content of this post resonated so well with me however that I decided to make an exception.

The following is attributed to Alit-Reza Anghaie a.k.a Packetknife.com. For those of you in similar situations I can only warmly recommend to consider and follow the advice. The emphasis is mine.

[Start of Excerpt] 
Alit-Reza Anghaie
I've had a fairly long and quite unintentional career in InfoSec ranging from Academic to Entertainment to Defense. Along the way a lot of mistakes were made or observed. This post marks the first in many installments to share lack of foresight turned into a graying face ghillie.

I'm not quite sure of the right format but I'm going with a Top Twenty - so I'll keep on the biggest pain points as I see them.


Publications

Tools

  • List of Volatility Plugins
    Leading the Open-source memory analysis field (Forensic, IR, exploit dev)
  • IDA Toolbag
    Excellent new set of tools for IDA PRO
  • Inception
    Upto-date Firewire Toolchain to dumping memory over the firewire interface. This allows also to unlock locked workstations as Firewire, per design, allows full access to memory over DMA.
  • Cryptshark
    .NET library using  Blowfish, BCrypt, SCrypt, and PBKDF2 for any HMAC - following my blog post on how to store password securely, if your into .NET give it a look.

Flame

News

Tools / Techniques

Flame / Malware

Microsoft's Certificate Fiasco

Misc

My Reads

News Articles
Miscellaneous