What did PHP crypt() and Alzheimer have in common ?
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I stumbled across this weird PHP bug in the crypt() implementation (version 5.3.7RC5) [1]
The bug reporter states that :
"If crypt() is executed with MD5 salts, the return value consists of the salt only."
In other words the call :
printf("MD5: %s\n", crypt('password', '$1$U7AjYB.O$'));

results in   
$1$U7AjYB.O

instead of:
$1$U7AjYB.O$L1N7ux7twaMIMw0En8UUR1

What this means is that in case we store a credential in a Database and later check for the validity of a password the check will always result in TRUE (i.e correct)
$saltedpass = crypt($pw, $salt);

Here is the patch that fixed it (Note how the the strlcat to strcat change was made):http://www.mail-archive.com/pld-cvs-commit@lists.pld-linux.org/msg261500.html

For readers unaware of the concept of a cryptographic "salt", look here
[1] https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=55439



Tools, Whitepapers, Talks
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Public Speaking

Below is a list of events at conferences that I presented at : 

"The Death of AV Defense in Depth?" - Cansecwest © hirsan


Excerpt of "Bluetooth Security - All your base are belong to us.

 Whitepapers
TLS/SSL Renegotiation Vulnerability (CVE-2009-3555)
This paper explains the SSLv3/TLS renegotiation vulnerability for a broader audience and summarizes the information that is currently available. It includes original research and Proof of concept code.

Updates:
  • Updated : Added SMTP over TLS attack scenario
  • Updated : Added FTPS analysis
  • Updated : New attacks against HTTPS introduced
  • Updated : PoC files for TRACE and 302 redirect using TLS rengotiation flaw

References
This paper is referenced by the US-CERT, DFN-CERT, BELNET-CERT, SWITCH-cert, Nessus, Qualys, c't Heise, and many more. Furthermore it has served as a internal Training paper for a major OS vendor.

Details
▪ TLS/SSLv3 renegotiation protocol vulnerability
▪ Blog post : SSLv3/TLS mitm vulnerability

Tags: Whitepaper, TLS/SSL Renegotiation Vulnerability

TLS/SSL hardening and compatibility report 2011
What started as an "I need an overview of best practise in SSL/TLS configuration" type of idea, ended in a 3 month code, reverse engineer and writing effort.

This paper aims at answering the following questions :
  • What SSL/TLS configuration is state of the art and considered secure enough ?
  • What SSL/TLS ciphers do modern browsers support ? What SSL/TLS settings do server and common SSL providers support ?
  • What are the cipher suites offering most compatibility and security ?
  • Should we really disable SSLv2 ? What about legacy browsers ?
  • How long does RSA still stand a chance ?What are the recommended hashes,ciphers for the next years to come

 The paper includes two free tools :
  • SSL Audit : SSL/TLS scanner
  • Harden SSL/TLS : Windows server and client SSL/TLS hardening tool
Details
▪ Download : SSL/TLS Hardening and Compatibility report 2010
▪ Download : SSL/TLS Hardening and Compatibility report 2011

Tags: SSL / TLS Compatibility Report

Tools

I  do not consider myself to be a developer, I have however during my career developed a lot of Proof of Concept code. including offensive and defensive tools that I have made public.


BTCrack 1.11
BTCrack was the worlds first Bluetooth Pass phrase (PIN) and linkkey brute-force tool. It was presented it the renowned SAAL1 at the 23C3 in Berlin. BTCrack will brute-force the Passkey and the Link key from captured Bluetooth pairing exchanges.

To capture the pairing exchange it is necessary to have a Professional Bluetooth Analyzer : FTE (BPA 100, BPA 105, others), Merlin OR to know how to flash a CSR based consumer USB dongle with special firmware. (Update 2011: Ubertooth also is a possibility now)

As of version 1.1, BTCrack started to include FPGA support through picocomputing E-Series.

Speed Comparison :
▪ P4 2Ghz - Dual Core  :      200.000 keys/sec
▪ FPGA E12 @ 50Mhz :   7.600.000 keys/sec
▪ FPGA E12 @ 75Mhz : 10.000.000 keys/sec
▪ FPGA E14                 :   30.000.000 keys/sec


Details
▪ Download BTCrack 1.1
▪ More information
▪ Talk : 23C3 - All your Bluetooth is belong to us
▪ Video : 23C3 All you Bluetooth is belong to us
▪ Talk : Heisec Scheunentor Bluetooth



Tags : Offensive, Proof of Concept


BTCrack Open Source Version (GPL)
This is a straight forward linux port of BTCrack.

Details
▪ Download BTCrack Open Source Version

Tags: Offensive, Proof of Concept



Secure-It

Secure-It™ is a local Windows security hardening tool, proactively secures your PC by either disabling the intrusion and propagation vectors proactively or simply by reducing the attack surface by disabling unimportant functions.
The tool secured Windows workstation  as-well as servers against new dangers by blocking the root cause of the vulnerabilities exploited by malware, worms and spyware. Secure-it had a track record of preventing several 0-day exploits pro actively

History of real-life proactive protection :
  • 2004 Protected against the Help Active X control exploit in advance.  
  • 2004 Protected against the second Help Active-X control exploit not correctly patched.
  • 2004 Protected against the DHTML Active-x Control exploit in advance. 

Note: Secure-it last update was in 2005 and some settings, like the active-x blacklist are outdated and should no longer be used. 

Details
▪ More information

Tags : Defensive, Hardening, Tool



Harden-it
Harden-It™ is a Network and System hardening tool for Windows, by hardening the IP stack your Network can sustain or completely thwart various sophisticated network attacks : 

  • Harden your server's TCP and IP stack (ICMP, SYN, SYN-ACK..) Reduces or mitigates effects from DoS and other network based attacks
  • Enable SYN flood protection when an attack is detected  ▪ Set the threshold values that are used to determine what constitutes an attack
  • Various other protections.
History of real-life proactive protection :
 ▪  2006 Protected against the Windows IGMP Denial of service attack in advance.

Details
▪ More information Tag

Tags : Defensive, Hardening, Tool 


Remote Administration Tool (GPL)
Remote Administration Tool is a small free remote control software package derived from the popular TightVNC software.

With "Remote Administration Tool", you can see the desktop of a remote machine and control it with your local mouse and keyboard, just like you would do it sitting in the front of that computer. Small, easy, no installation required.

Details
▪ More information

Tags :  Administration, Tool


CSS-DIE
CSSDIE is a community-developed fuzzer for verifying browser integrity, written by H D Moore, Matt Murphy, Aviv Raff, and Thierry Zoller. CSSDIE will look for common CSS1/CSS2/CSS3 implementation flaws by specifying common bad values for style values

Details
▪ More information

Tags: Fuzzer, Offensive, Tool


Omron Communicator 
This software is based on my efforts to reverse engineer the Hitachi Omron Hybrid Card readers. Omron Card readers are used in various commercial setups like ATM, identity management, payment systems, parking systems. The effort displayed on this blog is purely done out of research and awareness purposes.

Details
 ▪ Part 1 - Omron hybrid card reader - New toy
Tags: Reverse Engineering, Smartcard, Tool



Academic Papers - Please get the Sarcasm



The Influence of Bayesian Methodologies on Algorithms
Consistent hashing must work. Given the current status of random configurations, biologists famously desire the deployment of PKI, which embodies the intuitive principles of cryptanalysis.

 Signed, Large-Scale Methodologies for Public-Private Key Pairs
The implications of certifiable configurations have been far-reaching and pervasive. After years of confirmed research into flip-flop gates, we disprove the analysis of robots that would make simulating context free grammar a real possibility, which embodies the confusing principles of stenography.
Our focus in this work is not on whether multiprocessors can be made authenticated, random, and empathic, but rather on presenting new semantic communication (Moo).
The study of the location-identity split has evaluated linked lists, and current trends suggest that the analysis of evolutionary programming will soon emerge.
Unified optimal symmetries have led to many extensive advances, including SCSI disks and agents [10]. After years of appropriate research into cache coherence, we prove the improvement of digital-to-analog converters, which embodies the robust principles of cryptanalysis. Valence, our new heuristic for the construction rasterization, is the solution to all of these problems.
The emulation of erasure coding is an essential challenge. ApodAni, our new framework for pseudo random theory, is the solution to all of these grand challenges.


 Excerpt of discovered Vulnerabilities
Below is an overview of new vulnerabilities I have discovered, coordinated and disclosed, this list does not include vulnerabilities that were being discovered during my professional career.



2020

Hardware 
I am by far not an electronic engineer - I learned to solder and modified a bit of hardware as a hobby and out of interest.

This is my version of the the Bluetooth Sniper weapon, it features a medium sized YAGI antenna combined with a 10* magnification scope and a metalized parabolic which may bundle the Bluetooth signal, thus further enhancing the range.
A long term project with regards to USB devices and security.



CVE-2010-x+n - Loadlibrary/Getprocaddress roars its evil head in 2010
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After Acrossecurity, published an interesting vulnerability and HDmoore appears to have stumbled on the same issue, I decided to investigate on my own. I am not 100% sure it's the same bug but I am pretty confident. While it is known since years and Microsoft even dedicates a KB article to it, vendors appear to still have issues with using Loadlibrary/Getprocadress correctly.

Above does not show vulnerable examples (i.e the dll is not effectively loaded)

This issue appears to have been first discovered by Georgi Guninski (who else) in 2000, so it is not a new weakness and defensive mechanisms have been introduced into development languages as well as windows itself to mitigate this risk (if properly used)

If I will find more time this week I'll publish more details and backround as to introduce counter measures and checks into your hopefully mature Development Lifecycle.

In summary :
If loadlibrary is not called correctly AND/OR DLL Search path is not hardened opening a file located on a share will lead to DLL files being located on the share and code being executed that is within that DLL. Above is an example of Photoshop.

Until then know that this issue can be mitigated by deploying proper GPO policies that disables searching for DLLs on UNC paths (Documented in http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2264107)

Development Best practises that can protect against this weakness/vulnerability :
Tools to detect said bug class :
Mitigate this particular attack vector through GPO policies:
More information :
    Expect a lot of applications vulnerable to this bug and my title CVE-2010-x+n probably makes sense by now. Another low hanging fruit to watch out for.



    CVE-2010-2568 - LNK Code execution - Proof of concept (Update)
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     Ivanlef0u released a POC for the exploit used in targeted attacks :

    More information :
    Mitigations :

    • Disable display of icons (regedit changes proposed by the MS Bulletin)
    • Use of Kernel mode protection drivers (Ariad, Sophos, etc.pp)


    Callstack:

    kd> g
    Breakpoint 1 hit
    eax=00000001 ebx=00f5ee7c ecx=0000c666 edx=00200003 esi=00000001 edi=7c80a6e4
    eip=7ca78712 esp=00f5e9c4 ebp=00f5ec18 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na po nc
    cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000202
    SHELL32!_LoadCPLModule+0x10d:
    001b:7ca78712 ff15a0159d7c    call    dword ptr [SHELL32!_imp__LoadLibraryW (7c9d15a0)] ds:0023:7c9d15a0={kernel32!LoadLibraryW (7c80aeeb)}
    kd> dd esp
    00f5e9c4  00f5ee7c 000a27bc 00f5ee78 00000000
    00f5e9d4  00000020 00000008 00f5ee7c 00000000
    00f5e9e4  00000000 0000007b 00000000 00000000
    00f5e9f4  00200073 002000e0 0000064c 0000028c
    00f5ea04  1530000a 00000000 003a0043 0064005c
    00f5ea14  006c006c 0064002e 006c006c 006d002e
    00f5ea24  006e0061 00660069 00730065 00000074
    00f5ea34  00090608 7c92005d 00000000 00000007
    kd> db 00f5ee7c
    00f5ee7c  43 00 3a 00 5c 00 64 00-6c 00 6c 00 2e 00 64 00  C.:.\.d.l.l...d.
    00f5ee8c  6c 00 6c 00 00 00 92 7c-c8 f2 f5 00 00 17 72 02  l.l....|......r.
    00f5ee9c  4b d2 00 00 d8 f2 f5 00-8b d2 a1 7c 00 00 00 00  K..........|....
    00f5eeac  ac 80 9d 7c 30 d8 0d 00-34 d8 0d 00 b8 d7 0d 00  ...|0...4.......
    00f5eebc  9a d2 a1 7c 30 d8 0d 00-c8 f2 f5 00 50 40 15 00  ...|0.......P@..
    00f5eecc  50 40 15 00 00 00 00 00-b8 00 92 7c 40 b7 0c 00  P@.........|@...
    00f5eedc  a8 ef f5 00 41 00 92 7c-18 07 09 00 5d 00 92 7c  ....A..|....]..|
    00f5eeec  c8 f2 f5 00 00 ef f5 00-00 00 00 00 b8 00 92 7c  ...............|
    kd> kv
    ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child
    00f5ec18 7ca81a74 00f5ee7c 000a27bc 00f5f2c4 SHELL32!_LoadCPLModule+0x10d (FPO: [1,145,4])
    00f5ee50 7ca82543 00f5ee74 000a27bc 000a27c0 SHELL32!CPL_LoadAndFindApplet+0x4a (FPO: [4,136,4])
    00f5f294 7cb56065 000a25b4 000a27bc 000a27c0 SHELL32!CPL_FindCPLInfo+0x46 (FPO: [4,264,4])
    00f5f2b8 7ca13714 00000082 00000000 00000104 SHELL32!CCtrlExtIconBase::_GetIconLocationW+0x7b (FPO: [5,0,0])
    00f5f2d4 7ca1d306 000a25ac 00000082 00f5f570 SHELL32!CExtractIconBase::GetIconLocation+0x1f (FPO: [6,0,0])
    00f5f410 7ca133b6 000dd7e0 00000082 00f5f570 SHELL32!CShellLink::GetIconLocation+0x69 (FPO: [6,68,4])
    00f5f77c 7ca03c88 000dd7e0 00000000 0015aa00 SHELL32!_GetILIndexGivenPXIcon+0x9c (FPO: [5,208,4])
    00f5f7a4 7ca06693 00131c60 000dd7e0 0015aa00 SHELL32!SHGetIconFromPIDL+0x90 (FPO: [5,0,4])
    00f5fe20 7ca12db0 00131c64 0015aa00 00000000 SHELL32!CFSFolder::GetIconOf+0x24e (FPO: [4,405,4])
    00f5fe40 7ca15e3c 00131c60 00131c64 0015aa00 SHELL32!SHGetIconFromPIDL+0x20 (FPO: [5,0,0])
    00f5fe68 7ca03275 000f8090 0014d5b0 0014a910 SHELL32!CGetIconTask::RunInitRT+0x47 (FPO: [1,2,4])
    00f5fe84 75f11b9a 000f8090 75f11b18 75f10000 SHELL32!CRunnableTask::Run+0x54 (FPO: [1,1,4])
    00f5fee0 77f49598 00155658 000cb748 77f4957b BROWSEUI!CShellTaskScheduler_ThreadProc+0x111 (FPO: [1,17,0])
    00f5fef8 7c937ac2 000cb748 7c98e440 0014cfe0 SHLWAPI!ExecuteWorkItem+0x1d (FPO: [1,0,4])
    00f5ff40 7c937b03 77f4957b 000cb748 00000000 ntdll!RtlpWorkerCallout+0x70 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
    00f5ff60 7c937bc5 00000000 000cb748 0014cfe0 ntdll!RtlpExecuteWorkerRequest+0x1a (FPO: [3,0,0])
    00f5ff74 7c937b9c 7c937ae9 00000000 000cb748 ntdll!RtlpApcCallout+0x11 (FPO: [4,0,0])
    00f5ffb4 7c80b729 00000000 00edfce4 00edfce8 ntdll!RtlpWorkerThread+0x87 (FPO: [1,7,0])
    00f5ffec 00000000 7c920250 00000000 00000000 kernel32!BaseThreadStart+0x37 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])



    Top 10 Vulnerability Researcher 2009
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    Thanks @edisoar for the hint: IBM ISS collected information about the researches that discovered and published most Vulnerabilities in 2009 and apparently I am one of them :).

    One should add that XSS was also counted as a vulnerability, would this type of low key vulnerability have been ignored I would have moved up by a few places.


    Some vulnerabilities included on that list can be found here, including Remote code execution vulnerabilies in products from SUN, Oracle, Microsoft, Apple (Iphone). Needless to say that all of those vulnerabilities have been disclosed responsibly adhering to the responsible disclosure guideline.

    Source: IBM ISS